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Notes
THE AUTHOR'S DILEMMA
Thousands of words have been written about the tax discrimin-
ation against authors1 as compared with inventors and other tax-
paying citizens. It is the purpose of this paper to trace the steps of
this area of tax law as applied to copyrighted works from its in-
ception to the present; to explore its course through both legislative
and case law development. At the finale, the reader should know
specifically what the law is at present and how it has developed, but
he will grope for sound reasons why it is so, without success. If he
becomes incensed because of the author's dilemma, he may find some
consolation in the section which points up the few things an author
can do to partially relieve his harsh tax burden in the years in which
he realizes some financial success.
Constitutional Justification
The author's plea for equal rights with his brother inventor is
well-founded indeed. In fact, it derives from that most eminent of
legal foundation, the United States Constitution. Congress is em-
powered by the Constitution "To promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts by securing for limited Times to Authors and In-
ventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Dis-
coveries."2 It should be noted that in the order of mention in this
constitutional provision the word "Authors" preceeds "Inventors" and
"Writings" preceeds "Discoveries." It is difficult to believe that the
drafters of the Constitution, many of whom were men of great minds
and literary accomplishment, intended that the rights and privileges
of literary creators should be subordinated to anyone. Unfortunately,
the seed planted therein, meant to bear fruitful results, has instead
resulted in a thistle which consistently becomes longer and sharper
and will continue to do so until the author commences to kick against
the pricks.
The philosophy behind this constitutional grant of favor is very
simple. By encouraging individual effort with personal gain, the
entire public will benefit from production of scientific and literary
*This paper was submitted in the Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition,
sponsored by the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers.
1 The word "authors" is used in its generic sense to describe all creators of
copyrightable works.
2 U.S. Const. art. I, 8, cl. 8.
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achievements. But in order that the individual creator be encouraged,
he must not be deprived of his personal gain. "Income arises from
the author's efforts to exploit his creation and it is with this phase
of the copyright system that the income tax deals."3 Diminishment of
the author's income means diminishment of the constitutionally in-
tended incentive to create, and there is no greater diminisher than a
harsh and unfair tax.
The Author's Needs
In pointing out the discrepancies existing between the tax treat-
ment accorded to patents and that accorded to copyrights, a well-
known practicing lawyer wrote with striking candor:
When authors achieve a favorable tax result, however, Congress sees
only a loophole that must be plugged at once. Apparently, authors don't
need incentives the way inventors do; or, alternatively, we as a nation
do not particularly value what they have to contribute. Either way,
Congress has in the tax field reformulated the policy inherent in the
Constitution and has reached alarming results.4
Authors and inventors are both in a peculiar boat, taxwise. They
may work for years on a particular project without reaping any
financial success during those years. If they are finally able to market
a successful work, they may receive most of the compensation in one
tax year. Therefore, under the present sharply graduated personal
income tax rates, their actual realized net income is considerably less
than that of other taxpayers who earned the same amount in the same
period of time. The most feasible means of alleviating this "bunched
income" inequality is to allow authors and inventors capital gains
treatment on the income from their productions rather than sub-
jecting them to the tax rates on ordinary income. It is in their efforts
to obtain this treatment that their status as brothers in creativity
has ended. The inventors have achieved a great deal of success while
authors have met with dismal failure. In fact, they have become
the Jacob and Esau of Congressional consideration-the one it loved
and the other it hated.
The Law Prior to 1950
Prior to 1950 the Internal Revenue Code did not expressly pre-
scribe the tax treatment of patents, copyrights, and similar property.
Capital gains treatment could be obtained only where the copyright
or similar item was considered under the general provisions of the
3 Note, Taxation of Literary Property Income, 12 Mercer L. Rev. 870 (1961).
4 Pilpel, Developments in Tax Law Affecting Copyrights in 1954, 83 Taxes271 (1955).
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statute as a "capital asset" which had been "sold or exchanged."5
Under the "capital asset" requirement, the taxpayer had to qualify
as an "amateur" author or inventor. This requirement was considered
satisfied if there was a sale of only one invention, as a result of tax-
payer's spare time work." This meant that in order to get capital
gains treatment for income derived from the sale of patented or copy-
righted works, the sale or transfer must not have been of property
held primarily for sale to customers in any trade or business.
The second requirement-that the capital asset be "sold" or "ex-
changed"-presented another hurdle. The difficulty developed in two
areas of commercial practice-transfer of rights on a royalty basis
and transfer of less than all rights, i.e., limitation to a particular
medium or geographical area. "Where the question was whether a
sale had taken place under the capital gains provisions of the tax laws,
however, the courts generally answered that anything less than a
transfer of the 'complete bundle of rights' resulted in a license, not
a sale."7 But in Edward C. Myerss the court held that an agreement
whereby the inventor transferred his interests in an invention to a
buyer in consideration of five percent royalty, was a sale of a capital
asset within the meaning of section 117 (a) of the Internal Revenue
Code.9 However, the Internal Revenue Service announced in 1950 that
it would consider royalties as ordinary income, thereby withdrawing its
acquiescence in the Myers decision.10 It was the Commissioner's con-
clusion that the income realized in Myers was derived from the
creator's personal service and skill, hence, ordinary income.
Loophole Plugging
In 1948, the first major step of Congressional "loophole plugging"
was triggered by the sale of Crusades in Europe by Dwight Eisen-
hower. He sold the manuscripts for a lump sum and was permitted
capital gains treatment. The Revenue Act of 1950 added what are
now sections 1221(3) and 1231(b) (1) (C).
In. Rev. Code, § 1221. Capital Asset Defined.
For the purposes of this subtitle, the term "capital asset" means property
held by the taxpayer (whether or not connected with his trade or busi-
ness), but does not include-
(3) a copyright, a literary, musical, or artistic composition or similar
property, held by-
5 Bittker, Federal Income, Estate and Gift Taxation 415 (2d ed. 1958).6Edward C. Myers, 6 T.C. 258 (1946).
7 Note, supra note 3, at 377.
86 T.C. 258 (1946).
9 Now Int. Rev. Code 1221, 1222.
10 Mim. 6490, 1950-1 C.B., reaffirmed Rev. Rul. 55-58, 1955-1 C.B. 97.
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(A) a taxpayer whose personal efforts created the property, or
(B) a taxpayer in whose hands the basis of such property is de-
termined, for the purpose of determining gain from a sale or exchange,
in whole or in part by reference to the basis of such property in the
hands of the person whose personal efforts created such property;
Thus, literary property was specifically excluded from the capital asset
definition.
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954, section 1231(b) (1) (C), ex-
cludes from the definition of property used in the trade or business
"a copyright, a literary, musical, or artistic composition, or similar
property, held by a taxpayer described in paragraph (3) of section
1221." This section rules out a possible "quasi-capital asset" definition
of copyright and patents under section 1231. The result of this enact-
ment is clear. From 1950 to 1954, neither professional nor amateur
authors were allowed capital gains treatment on the sale of their
writings while amateur inventors were granted such allowance. The
trend toward discrimination was thus established.
Discrimination Complete
The cases indicate that prior to 1950 there was little if any dis-
tinction made between inventors and authors. But with passage of
the 1950 Amendment their paths diverged. The trend reached its
logical culmination in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 which
accorded to professional as well as amateur inventors capital gains
status for the proceeds from sale of their inventions.
Int. Rev. Code, § 1235. Sale or Sxchange of Patents.
(a) General-A transfer (other than by gift, inheritance, or device) of
property consisting of all substantial rights to a patent, or an undivided
interest therein which includes a part of all such rights, by any holder
shall be considered the sale or exchange of a capital asset held for
more than 6 months, regardless of whether or not payments in consider-
ation of such transfer are-
(1) payable periodically over a period generally coterminus with
the transferees use of the patent, or
(2) contingent on the productivity, use, or disposition of the prop-
erty transferred.
This legislation prompted this remark- "... it would be very
difficult indeed, today, to set up the sale of a patent interest by the
creator of the patent which wouldn't qualify for capital gains treat-
ment, even as it is impossible to set up a sale of a copyright interest
by the creator of the copyright that would qualify.""
It should be noted that section 1235 assures the transferor of
a patent interest capital gains treatment even if his compensation
11 Pilpel, supra note 4, at 272.
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is received through a royalty arrangement. This is a direct endorse-
ment of the Myers decision and a rejection of the Revenue Services
contrary view as expressed in Rev. RUl. 55-58. The Myers view was
again upheld in F. H. Philbrick.12 But in Authur M. Young,' 3 patent
royalty payments received pursuant to an agreement whereby all
patent interests were assigned for the period of the agreement were
held not received from a transfer of "all substantial interests." The
court defined substantial rights in a patent as "generally the exclusive
rights for a term of 17 years to make, use, and vend the patent through-
out the United States and territories thereof."14
As will be later noted, the Internal Revenue Service finally ac-
quiesced in the Myers case as to patents in 1958.15 Then in 1960, the
Service announced that it would apply the same principle to copy-
rights.16 Therefore, at present a transfer of exclusive rights to a copy-
righted work is to be treated as a sale, even though payments are
measured by a percentage of the receipts or by the volume of sales.
This final ironic touch means that the Revenue Service at last accepts
the theory of the divisibility of copyright, but such acceptance is too
late to be of value to the plagued authors because now, as has been
pointed out, under the so-called Eisenhower amendment, copyrights
do not qualify for capital gains treatment in the hands of their
creators.
Present Status
A look at some fairly recent cases will reflect the present tax status
of the author with respect to his copyrighted and similar works.
Most of these cases involve attempts to gain capital asset treatment
for works not actually copyrightable but none the less "similar"
properties such as motion picture characters and rights to family
privacy. In a line of cases since 1954, capital gains treatment has been
consistently denied. One of the most prominent was the case of
Stern v. United States'7 involving a sale of rights to the character
called "Francis," the talking mule. The creator of the character sold to
Universal Pictures all his "right, title, and interest" for a consider-
ation of $50,000, plus 5% of the net profits from photoplays based
on the character. This "sale" was effective only for a period of two
years and unless a picture was made within this "commitment
period" the property would revert to the seller. The court, applying
12 27 T.C. 346 (1956).
'329 T.C. 850 (1958).
14 Authur M. Young, supra note 13, at 858.
15 Rev. Rul. 58-353, 1958-2 Cum. Bull. 408.
16 Rev. Ru. 60-226, 1960-1 Cum. Bull. 26.
17 164 F. Supp. 847 (E.D. La. 1958).
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the liberal construction of Myers called this transaction a "sale," not
just a license. It further concluded that the property was not held by
taxpayer for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business be-
cause taxpayer was primarily a publisher, not a writer. Therefore, the
first two hurdles were successfully cleared. The final hurdle-the 1950
amendment exluding from capital gains treatment income from the
sale of "a copyright; a literary, musical, or artistic composition; or
similar property"-proved fatal. The taxpayer argued ingeniously
that "Francis" was not "similar property,"' 8 but rather an "intellec-
tual conception," not subject to copyright. However, the court said:
"It is this court's view that the character Francis, irrespective of its
susceptibility to copyright, is 'a literary composition' and as such
the income from the sale thereof is not entitled to capital gains
treatment."19
In Runyon v. United States,20 the son of the eminent sports writer,
Damon Runyon, gave to a producer the "license" to "produce, release,
distribute and exhibit" a motion picture based on Runyon's life. The
court denied taxpayer capital gains treatment on the income and held
(1) that under New York law no right of privacy exists on behalf
of the son of a deceased person, and (2) even if such right did exist,
there was no "sale" of such "property right" in this case-merely a
"limited right" transfer. In other words, the court is now using the
"bundle of rights" concept to deny capital gains to non-copyright-
able and non-invention type transactions.
It is interesting to note in two other cases 1 with similar facts to
Runyon-except the favorable treatment was sought for inventors-
the court held that a provision for termination in the event of failure
to perform does not prevent a transfer of a patent from being an
absolute sale. But in the Runyon case, such a provision was consid-
ered sufficient to preclude a "sale." At any rate, the present situation
clearly discriminates against authors and creators of copyrighted
works and similar works by denying them the same taxpayer status
enjoyed by inventors. Such a policy eludes explanation.
It may be a sound argument indeed that the pre-1950 distinction
between amateur and professional authors should have been elim-
18Taxpayer insisted that the Internal Revenue Service itself had limited the
words "or similar property" to property capable of being copyrighted. His ref-
erence was to the Treasury Regulations (Treas. Reg. 118, Section 39.117 (a)-1):
'"he phrase 'similar property includes, for example, such property as a theatrical
production, a radio program, a newspaper cartoon strip, or any other property
eligible fo copyright protection."
19 Stern v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 847, at 852 (E.D. La. 1958).
20281 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1960).
21 Allen v. Werner, 190 F.2d 840 (5th Cir. 1951); Bannister v. United States,
262 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1958).
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inated. Taxation on the income received from the sale of literary
property should not depend on the status of the creator. However,
it is submitted that in light of the need to encourage literary creative-
ness, the desired solution was not to harshly burden all writers and
creators but rather relieve both classes from such burden. The same
problem faced Congress with respect to inventors until 1954. But the
step made to correct that discrepancy was in the opposite direction
from the one made in 1950. Instead of eliminating capital gains treat-
ment entirely for both professional and amateur inventors, as was
done with respect to copyrighted works, capital gains treatment was
allowed to both classes of inventors. Why? Clearly Congress has arbi-
trarily decided that the constitutional provision favoring treatment
encouraging to, first, authors, then inventors, no longer need be
heeded except as applies to inventors. Surely, this is a most unfor-
tunate decision. In a country where reading is becoming a lost art
among many segments of our population, where crime and juvenile
delinquency is on rampant increase, where educational methods and
accomplishments are daily proving insufficient, the creators of free
individual thought must be encouraged. A leading writer has stated:
Apparently, our Senators and Representatives in their anxiety to
foster the development of offensive and defensive weapons in this age
of the atom, have forgotten that much of invention is based on the
knowledge contained in writings which are the subject of copyright
rather than patent. Moreover, it may well be that our greatest need
today is, in the words of Adlai Stevenson, for "the know-why of ethics
to catch up with the know-how of science"; and here our help comes
from what has been known and thought and is reflected in writings and
the arts, not from what has been or is being tangibly produced.22
This statement is equally true today as when written in 1955.
What can be done about this dilemma? One writer, in an attempt
to arouse the author's indignation, said: "* . . authors themselves are
largely responsible for their present sad plight. Although authors
possess the skill and eloquence necessary for effective advocacy, they
have been altogether too inactive and ineffectual in regard to their
own tax treatment."23 The writer points out that from 1950 to 1954,
inventors were very active in presenting their view before the con-
gressional hearings preceding revisions of the Revenue Code. During
this same period, authors were largely inactive. Therefore, in order
to alleviate their present burden, authors must organize their efforts
to bring about effective pressure on Congress. They truly hold the
pens with which they could write their own bill of favored tax treat-
22 Pilpel, supra note 4, at 276.
23 Note, 47 Ky. L.J. 529, at 548 (1958).
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ment. Through the medium of nationwide publicity, they have the
skill and means to alert and arouse an indignant public-their readers.
Readers and authors are voters, and when the voters speak with
decisiveness, Congressmen listen. But until such time when a sane,
fair and consistent tax policy is effectuated in keeping with the con-
stitutional policy of encouraging creative development, authors and
dealers in copyrights should be fully appraised of their rights and
remedies as they stand under the present law.
Literary property can, in some limited circumstances, produce
income taxable as capital gains rather than ordinary income. But,
the irony is that such treatment can never be obtained by the indi-
vidual creator. It also appears that a donee of such creator is also
denied capital gains treatment. The explanation for this discrimina-
tion among different classes of copyright holders is that capital gains
is not available to those whose personal efforts create the copy-
righted property. This is understandable. But, as has been pointed out,
the personal efforts of authors no more results in ordinary income
than does the personal efforts of inventors or scientists. The discrim-
ination is unwarrantedl
In determining just when the sale of a copyrighted work results
in a capital gain, it should be noted that some general requirements
must be met first. These requirements are that the particular trans-
action must be considered a "sale or exchange" and the property
must not have been held primarily for sale to customers in the or-
dinary course of trade or business. We have said that a donee of the
creator cannot receive capital gains treatment because his base in the
property is the same as the creators, and such allowance to the donee
wolud only result in a device of easy evasion. On the other hand, the
author or creator's estate and his legatees may receive capital gains
treatment because their base is computed at the death of the creator.
Another group to which capital gains is available, are purchasers
of copyrighted works. This group, known as commercial users, must
satisfy the Treasury that they bought the property as an investment,
and not to hold for sale to customers. Two 1954 cases indicate the
court's acceptance of this view. 24
The other "user" group are called "creator users" and is composed
of numerous individual artists engaged in a corporate creation. The
problem presented by such productions was evidently not consid-
ered by Congress and no decisions regarding it have been handed
down. However, the Treasury has indicated that property created
24James M. Fidler, 20 T.C. 1081 (1958); Fred MacMurray, 21 T.C. 15(1954).
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by these corporations would not be considered the result of personal
efforts.25 In regard to this position the law has taken, a leading New
York copyright lawyer said in 1955: "It is difficult to see how any
concession to the only two groups of people who can today claim
capital gains treatment for copyrights can in any way operate as an
incentive to living authors. ... 26 This statement properly evaluates
the existing situation. Even these small groups who were able to get
capital gains treatment were discriminated against to a certain ex-
tent. In the case of copyrights, unlike patents, capital gains was not
allowed if the consideration for the sale of the copyright was (1)
measured by a percentage of receipts from sale, performance, ex-
hibition or publication of the work, (2) measured by the number of
copies sold or performances given, or (3) paid for over a period gen-
erally coterminus with the grantee's use of the work. However, this
view was terminated by the ruling of 196027 acquiescing in the Myers
decision. This represents a development in the law slightly favorable
to holders of copyrighted property and it is hoped that this is the
beginning of a long-needed favorable trend.
Recent Developments
There are other methods by which the author may obtain some
small relief from the burden of bunched income. The first is a spread-
forward of income arrangement, available to both patent and copyright
owners. This method was approved in a case involving a general
agent of a life insurance company. 8 It allowed retired insurance
agents to report only that commission income actually received within
the taxable year for tax purposes, irrespective of when the company
collected the commissions for them. Therefore, using this case for
authority, copyright owners could choose to be paid in fixed sums or
royalty percentages over a number of years. This arrangement ap-
proaches the concept of the installment sale used by former Presi-
dent Truman in 1953, upon which he obtained a ruling approving
an installment sale of his memoirs.29
The spread-back provision is contained in Section 1302 of the
Code. Under that provision, copyright proprietors receiving income
from such work may spread the income therefrom back over a period
of three years if the work was produced over a 24 month period.
The most recent development in this area was enacted in the
25 ReV. Rul. 55-1955, 1955-2 Cum. Bull. 300.26 Pilpel, supra note 4, at 273.27 Rev. Rul. 60-226, 1960-1 Cum. Bull. 26.28 Oates v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1953).2 9 Rev. Rul. 234, 1953-2 Cum. Bull. 29.
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1964 Revenue Act. With respect to taxable years beginning after
1963, a new averaging device has been provided to ease the tax bite
on taxpayers having unusual fluctuations in income. It replaces the
old provisions which allowed averaging for certain types of income
including income from inventions or artistic work. The plan is very
complicated, and is applied by way of a new formula, different from
previous averaging concepts in that it does not require recomputation
of prior years' taxes. The formula is as follows:
1. Calculate excess of current year's income (computation year)
over 133!% of average annual income of four preceding years
(average base period income). This results in "averageable in-
come," which must be over $8,000 for the section to apply.
2. Compute tax on 1/5 the averageable income.
3. Multiply amount of tax computed in step 2 by five. This gives
total tax on averageable income.
4. Total tax equals the sum of the tax on the 1831% of the
average base period income and the tax on the averageable
income.
For example, under this new formula, an author who earns $7,500
per year during 1960-1963, and who earns $40,000 in 1964 by selling
a copyrighted work not subject to capital gains, would realize a tax
savings of at least $4,080. There appears to be no discrimination in
this new 1964 provision.
Conclusion
Authors and creators of copyrighted works and similar property
have consistently been subjected to unwarranted discrimination by
Congressional policy and judicial decision as reflected respectively by
the tax laws of the United States and their subsequent interpretation.
This discrimination has been effected by denying to authors capital
gains treatment on income received from the sale of such property,
while allowing inventors and owners of patent interests to report
income received from the sale of their products as capital gains. Such
a policy is contrary to the spirit of the Constitution of the United
States, Art. I, Section 8, which provides Congress with power to
encourage both authors and inventors, thereby indicating on its face
that both groups, not just inventors, should be so encouraged. It is
further submitted that such encouragement to writers is a paramount
necessity to the national interest and the public welfare.
Though the position of authors and creators of copyrighted works
at present can easily be characterized as one of "dilemma," there is
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some evidence of a slightly favorable trend. The trend is discernible
through three developments: (1) the reduction of the work period
required for spreading income from thirty-six to twenty-four months,
(2) the 1960 Revenue Service acquiescence in the Myers decision as
it applys to copyrights, and (3) the 1964 Revenue Act's averaging de-
vice. The interest in and need for continued creative production,
should be manifested by an aroused public, so that this mild trend
will be increased in force and effect and the unwarranted discrimina-
tion against authors be ended, once and for all.
Tommy W. Chandler
